Reforming remuneration schemes in the financial industry : some governance and implementation issues by Joachim Keller et al.
139
rEFOrmiNg rEmuNEraTiON SChEmES iN ThE FiNaNCial  
iNduSTry : SOmE gOvErNaNCE aNd imPlEmENTaTiON iSSuES
Reforming remuneration schemes in the 






One  of  the  major  and  most  contentious  issues  in  the 
current debate on how to restore financial stability is the 
design of remuneration schemes in financial institutions. 
Excessive risk-taking by banks was one of the underly-
ing causes of the credit crisis, and it appears that remu-
neration  schemes  for  key  bank  personnel  (e.g.,  CEOs, 
senior management, traders) may have encouraged such 
risk-taking. 
The  basic  concern  is  that  remuneration  schemes  have 
biased  decisions  towards  activities  yielding  short-term 
gains and shielded the decision-makers from the down-
side risk. This problem seems to have gone beyond the 
executive  level  in  financial  institutions,  affecting  many 
divisions  including  the  trading  room  and  the  business 
units in which structured finance products were arranged 
and  issued.  Employees  in  certain  areas  appear  to  have 
been more highly rewarded for maximising the volume 
of  transactions  and  recording  up-front  profit  than  for 
accurately assessing the underlying risk. In addition, the 
top management of some institutions sought to increase 
profit by expanding activities which were fast-growing but 
for which the risk was not well understood. The important 
role of compensation in the crisis and the need for change 
are now widely recognised. Indeed, one of the recom-
mendations made by policy-makers at the end of 2008 
was for regulators and supervisors to work with market 
participants to design compensation schemes that avoid 
rewards for excessive risk-taking. 
An illustration of the potential effects of compensation 
based  on  short-term  profit  is  the  incentive  that  it  pro-
vided institutions to issue and securitise (potentially low-
quality) loans, rather than holding them on balance sheet. 
Whereas banks earn origination fees when issuing loans, 
these fees are typically only recognised over the life of 
the loan when it is held on balance sheet. In contrast, the 
origination fee is recognised immediately when the loan 
is securitised and sold, for example, to an off-balance-
sheet entity. Moreover, the bank may earn an additional 
fee from packaging the loans into the securitised pool. 
Finally, the bank may be able to record a gain on sale of 
the loans, thereby “front-loading” the revenues (and the 
associated bonuses).  (1) 
This article considers some conceptual issues relating to 
the role of remuneration in financial institutions and dis-
cusses current policy proposals in light of these issues. We 
first observe that remuneration plays an important role in 
the corporate governance of firms, both nonfinancial and 
financial. Remuneration is traditionally viewed as one of 
the key mechanisms for aligning the interests of manag-
ers with those of shareholders, thereby helping to resolve 
agency problems linked to the separation of control and 
ownership of the firm. Yet, as is discussed in Section 1, 
the degree to which remuneration will actually succeed 
in aligning the interests of these two groups will depend 
upon  the  power  that  shareholders  have  to  approve   
(1)  See Goldman Sachs (2009) for a discussion of other regulatory and accounting 
advantages of packaging (and re-packaging) loans into structured products rather 
than retaining them on balance sheet.140
(or  veto)  proposed  compensation  schemes.  This  power 
varies  considerably  across  institutions  and  countries.  In 
this respect, the design of remuneration schemes may be 
considered as an agency problem in itself, in that manag-
ers may be able to influence “friendly” boards of directors 
to shape executive remuneration packages to suit their 
interests. Indeed, one recent observer has suggested that 
rather than focusing on the symptoms of poor govern-
ance (e.g., compensation schemes), it would be prefer-
able to concentrate directly on improving shareholders’ 
ability to discipline management.  (1) 
Yet, the notion of shareholder interests also includes risk 
appetite.  Financial  institutions  differ  from  nonfinancial 
firms in that excessive risk-taking by the former can have 
more  severe  impacts  on  the  financial  system  and  the 
economy.  In  fact,  the  potential  externalities  associated 
with  the  failure  of  financial  institutions  provide  one  of 
the  justifications  for  regulating  them.  While  prudential 
regulation is designed to limit risk-taking by financial insti-
tutions, the flexibility of financial markets and the speed 
of innovation mean that regulation will never be able to 
completely eliminate all excessive risk-taking. It is there-
fore important to understand the potential links between 
the compensation schemes for the senior employees of 
a financial institution and the risk profile of that institu-
tion. Prior to the crisis, too little account was taken of 
the  influence  of  remuneration  schemes  on  risk-taking. 
Compensation  schemes  need  to  provide  incentives  for 
behaviour that is consistent with the goals of regulation. 
Section 2 discusses the risk appetites of different stake-
holders  in  financial  institutions  and  the  implications  of 
aligning  managers’  and  shareholders’  risk  appetites  via 
remuneration  schemes.  It  observes  that  remuneration 
schemes which succeed in aligning the interests of man-
agers with those of shareholders may result in either more 
or less risk-taking than schemes which serve only mana-
gerial  interests.  In  addition,  since  shareholders  would 
prefer a higher level of risk than would debt holders or 
depositors, it may be desirable to adopt a more conserva-
tive  approach  to  the  design  of  remuneration  schemes 
for  financial  institutions  than  the  traditional  corporate 
governance view of remuneration would suggest. Stated 
differently,  whose  risk  appetite  should  remuneration 
schemes of financial institutions’ managers reflect ?
Another  feature  of  financial  institutions  is  that  remu-
neration contracts of non-executive employees (traders, 
senior employees in investment banking, etc.) are often 
characterised by a high variable cash component. As a 
consequence,  non-executive  personnel  sometimes  earn 
considerably  higher  cash  bonuses  than  the  executives.   
These personnel also often engage in activities that can 
have a significant impact on the risk profile of the institu-
tion. Moreover, remuneration for non-executive employ-
ees is often influenced by the desire to retain staff in the 
face of labour-market competition. For example, remuner-
ation schemes of traders for institutions’ proprietary trad-
ing desks in recent years came to resemble those of hedge 
funds, whose compensation contracts typically involve an 
“incentive” component consisting of anywhere between 
10 and 25 p.c. of the fund’s return, sometimes above a 
threshold  rate  (which  can  be  near  the  risk-free  rate).  (2) 
This influence of hedge funds on the compensation of 
non-executive  employees  in  financial  institutions  also 
likely had a “contagion” effect on executive compensa-
tion. The resulting implications for compensation schemes 
and  risk-taking  within  regulated  financial  institutions 
suggest that the rise of hedge funds may have played a 
more central role in the crisis than has previously been 
acknowledged.
To  date,  corporate  governance  codes  and  regulations 
have focused on the remuneration of directors and execu-
tives, and less attention has been paid to the remunera-
tion schemes of non-executive staff. Disclosure relating 
to  non-executive  employees’  compensation  is  generally 
not  required  by  regulation  nor  provided  by  financial 
institutions. The circumstances in which special attention 
needs to be paid to remuneration of non-executives and 
the  degree  to  which  current  policy  proposals  focus  on 
remuneration at all levels within financial institutions are 
among the issues discussed in the remaining sections of 
this article.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the 
traditional view of executives’ remuneration in corporate 
governance and the process through which managerial 
remuneration is determined. Section 2 considers implica-
tions of the pay-setting process for risk-taking in financial 
institutions and discusses the potential role for regulation. 
Section 3 discusses a number of current policy proposals 
relating to remuneration practices in financial institutions 
and identifies some potential difficulties with respect to 
implementation, including the challenge of linking com-
pensation to measures of risk.
(1)  Charles Calomiris, “Financial Reforms We Can All Agree On”, The Wall Street 
Journal, April 23, 2009.
(2)  See, for example, Stultz (2007).141
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(1)  Within any institution, there are two functions that must be fulfilled : supervision 
and management. Some countries (for instance Italy and the UK) use a single-tier 
board structure, in which both functions are performed within the board of 
directors. The supervisory function is performed by the non-executive directors 
of the board and the management function is performed by the executive 
directors of the board. Normally, shareholders elect board members at the general 
meeting. Board members appoint executive directors within the board.  
Other countries (for instance the Netherlands or Germany) use a two-tier board 
structure. The supervisory function is performed in this case by the board of 
directors (or supervisory board) and the management function is carried out by 
the senior management. Shareholders elect the supervisory board members at the 
general meeting. The supervisory board appoints the senior management. 
(2)  A board may become passive or “captured” by management for a variety 
of reasons including : conflicts of interest where directors form the senior 
management group ; board dynamics which often result in deference and 
politeness towards the chief executive ; social ties ; and the influence of the chief 
executive over the appointment of directors.
(3)  It should be noted that these rules have been applied only to listed firms.
1.    The remuneration-setting process : 
corporate governance and agency 
problems
Designing a remuneration scheme is not only a means 
to  resolve  an  agency  problem  between  firm  managers 
and shareholders but is also an agency problem in itself, 
because  of  the  potential  conflicts  of  interest  between 
shareholders  and  board  members,  who  in  practice  set 
the pay on behalf of shareholders but who may not be 
an  effective  agent  for  the  shareholders.  Consequently, 
it is important to understand the process through which 
remuneration is set and the factors that determine the 
degree of control shareholders may exert over managers’ 
pay.
The  appropriate  governance  arrangement  with  regard 
to remuneration policy should give the responsibility for 
designing  and  overseeing  pay  schemes  to  independent 
remuneration  committees  set  up  within  the  board  of 
directors. In addition, it is important to have adequate 
involvement of shareholders and, in the case of financial 
institutions, the risk and compliance functions should also 
play a direct role in setting and moderating remuneration 
policy. The current crisis has in fact revealed that in the 
past, management and governance of risk were generally 
considered  to  be  unrelated  to  compensation  schemes. 
Little attention was given by banks’ control bodies or by 
supervisory authorities to the implications in terms of risk 
of the compensation systems in financial institutions.
The  remuneration  package  of  executive  directors  and 
senior  management  is  normally  set  by  non-executive 
board members (or supervisory board members in com-
panies  with  a  two-tier  board  structure  (1)).  In  practice, 
conflicts  of  interest  in  compensation  decisions  arise 
because executives have the possibility of influencing the 
decision of the board (supervisory board) on their level of 
remuneration, particularly in the cases where best practice 
is ignored and they sit on remuneration committees. A 
board affected by conflicts of interest may have a poor 
incentive  to  bargain  in  shareholders’  interests  on  the 
optimal incentive pay.  (2) Rather, it may use the pay-setting 
process  to  influence  pay  and  extract  rents.  According 
to  best  practice  in  corporate  governance,  firms  should 
establish  within  the  board  a  remuneration  committee 
which should be composed exclusively of non-executive 
directors, the majority of whom should be independent. 
The role of independent directors or of an independent 
remuneration committee is to manage conflicts of interest 
in compensation decisions by bringing an objective view 
to the pay-setting process. Moreover, these committees 
should seek advice from independent outside experts. 
The  possibility  for  shareholders  to  adequately  manage 
the  conflicts  of  interest  becomes  important,  especially 
since managers’ interests are often different from those 
of  shareholders.  Moreover,  as  discussed  in  more  detail 
in Section 2, the risk appetite of managers may also be 
quite different from that of shareholders. Yet, the actual 
degree of control shareholders have over executive com-
pensation will depend on a number of factors, including 
the  rights  accorded  by  the  corporate  governance  rules 
and  the  regulatory  framework  to  shareholders  in  the 
remuneration-setting  process,  the  ownership  structure 
of the firm, and the level of disclosure by the firm of its 
pay levels and policies. These factors are discussed in the 
remainder of this section.
1.1  Corporate governance rules
Having  a  binding  vote  on  directors’  remuneration  pro-
vides shareholders with some control over executive pay. 
Hence,  provided  they  have  sufficient  information  and 
expertise to evaluate the remuneration package and suf-
ficient weight in the firm’s decisions (i.e. voting rights), 
shareholders can in fact limit the conflicts of interest aris-
ing via compensation structures. When shareholders have 
only an advisory vote, however, the level of disclosure by 
the firm becomes important, as it signals the account-
ability of the firm, and it may also allow shareholders to 
publicly express an informed (advisory) view regarding the 
remuneration package or to apply pressure on the board 
to justify its decisions in terms of pay choices. 
The regulatory strategies adopted by European countries 
differ in the rights granted to shareholders with respect 
to approval of remuneration schemes.  (3) Box 1 discusses 
some of the observed differences, with reference both to 
regulation and to corporate governance best practice, on 
the role given to shareholders on remuneration issues. 
In  general,  with  respect  to  the  regulatory  framework 
governing  directors’  and  executives’  remuneration  in 
European countries, it appears that regulation more fre-
quently covers disclosure of directors’ pay, while corporate 142
Box 1  –  Public regulation and corporate governance codes
In several European countries, such as Belgium  (1) and Italy  (2) for instance, shareholders are required by law to 
approve non-executive directors’ fees on a regular basis (normally every two or three years depending on the 
country and the company). Shareholders, however, are not required to vote on the executives’ remuneration 
package. Nevertheless, share option plans (and similar equity-based plans) require simple majority approval by 
shareholders prior to implementation. 
In Spain and the UK, shareholders have an advisory vote on remuneration schemes. The UK is the most advanced 
European country in terms of remuneration disclosure and practice.  (3) As a result of the 2002 revision of the 1985 
Companies Act, directors of a listed company are required to submit to shareholders a detailed annual directors’ 
remuneration report for each financial year. The vote of shareholders, however, is purely advisory. The UK also 
imposes shareholder approval requirements on the adoption of certain option and long-term incentive plans via 
the Listing Rules. Applicable from 2008, the corporate governance code in Spain recommends that companies 
submit a remuneration report to shareholders for an advisory vote.  (4)
The Netherlands is the only European country (closely followed only by the Scandinavian countries), where, as of 
2004, listed companies were legally required to submit the remuneration report for the next financial year and 
subsequent years for shareholders’ approval under a binding resolution.  (5)
governance codes have increasingly tended to be applied 
with  respect  to  the  manner  in  which  directors’  and 
executives’ compensation is set and disclosed for listed 
companies.  (1) 
The “comply or explain” principle has formed the basis 
of  the  European,  code-based  approach  to  corporate 
governance  for  listed  firms.  This  approach  means  that 
companies  adopting  the  code  either  confirm  that  they 
have complied with the code’s provisions or – where they 
have not – provide an explanation. Differences exist across 
European countries with regard to adoption of corporate 
governance codes. In the UK, for instance, the adoption 
of  the  Combined  Code  is  mandatory  under  the  Listing 
Rules ;  companies  are  required  to  report  on  how  they 
have applied the Combined Code in their annual report 
and accounts. In most of the other European countries, 
adoption of the code is recommended as best practice 
and companies adopt it on a voluntary basis. However, 
doubts  have  recently  been  expressed  concerning  the 
effectiveness of the principle of “comply or explain” for 
banks, and sentiment appears to be building for making 
certain principles legally binding.  (2)
Both regulation and corporate governance code guidance 
with respect to executive pay appear to have developed 
earlier  and  more  extensively  in  the  UK  (followed  by 
Ireland) than in continental Europe. The tighter regula-
tion in the UK may, to some extent, reflect the owner-
ship structure of UK companies, in light of the fact that 
diffuse ownership systems give rise to more problems in 
remuneration-setting. The role that ownership structure 
may play on shareholders’ ability to influence remunera-
tion packages is discussed further in the Section 1.2.
(1)  See Ferrarini and Moloney (2005).
(2)  In March 2006, the European Corporate Governance Forum, which examines 
best practices in Member States in the field of corporate governance, issued a 
public statement on the “comply or explain” principle, which was welcomed by 
Internal Market and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy. There is agreement 
that “comply or explain” can work only if its surrounding regulatory framework 
ensures that companies respect the obligation to give reasons for deviations from 
the applicable corporate governance codes.
(1)  Under Royal Decrees. The Belgian Corporate Governance Code (Code Lippens 2004, as amended in 2009) contains non-binding provisions regarding executive and 
non-executive directors’ pay, as well as on the level of transparency of the procedure through which executives’ remuneration is set and the level of disclosure about 
directors’ remuneration, on an individual basis for all executives and non-executive directors.
(2)  Under the Italian Civil Code, Legislative Decree 58/1998. The Italian Corporate Governance Code (Preda Code 1999, as amended in 2006), based on the “comply or 
explain” principle and adopted by listed companies on a voluntary basis, contains recommendations on directors’ remuneration (pay packages aligning the interests 
of executive directors and shareholders in a medium- to long-term timeframe ; majority independent remuneration committee). 
(3)  Remuneration/incentive schemes in the UK for financial institutions are governed by the following legislation and bodies : the Companies Act 2006, the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance, the guidelines issued by the Associations of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), UK Listing 
Rules.
(4)  The Unified Code of Good Practices (Código Unificado de Buen Gobierno of the CNMV 2006) for firms traded on the stock market represents the main source of 
guidelines for the compensation policy in Spain. Compliance with these recommendations is voluntary.
(5)  Under the Dutch Civil Code. The Dutch Corporate Governance Code (Tabaksblat Code 2003, as amended in 2008) contains provisions on remuneration policy for 
directors (supervisory and management board members), disclosure of individual remuneration, and setting up remuneration committees within supervisory boards.143
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The  coverage  of  corporate  governance  rules,  however, 
may not be sufficient. While the existing regulatory strate-
gies mainly focus on remuneration schemes for executives 
and senior management in listed companies, there are no 
specific legal requirements nor best practice recommen-
dations  regarding  remuneration  of  employees  at  lower 
hierarchical levels in the organisation. This may be crucial 
in the case of financial institutions.
In  fact,  the  remuneration  contracts  of  non-executive 
employees (traders, etc.) in financial institutions are often 
characterised by a high variable cash component. As a 
consequence, traders sometimes earn much more than 
the  executives  in  terms  of  cash  bonuses.  Shareholders 
have no impact on the design of these schemes, which 
are decided by the business units’ managers or by human 
resource departments and are normally not disclosed. This 
may not be a problem if senior management’s interests 
are fully aligned with those of shareholders, since in that 
case it should be in managers’ interest to similarly align 
compensation packages for key employees. On the other 
hand, to the extent that senior managers’ interests are not 
perfectly aligned with those of shareholders, agency prob-
lems associated with the remuneration of non-executive 
staff may be magnified.
In addition, competition in the labour market can influ-
ence compensation packages, and this appears to have 
been a potentially important factor in recent years for 
certain  key  non-executive  employees  with  influence 
over  the  risk-taking  of  the  institution.  This  type  of 
development,  however,  introduces  the  possibility  that 
unregulated financial institutions, such as hedge funds, 
can exert an indirect influence on the structure of com-
pensation  (and  activities)  of  regulated  institutions.  A 
study that provides some support for this idea is that 
of Philippon and Reshef (2009), who compare wages, 
education and occupations in the US financial and nonfi-
nancial sectors over the past century (1909-2006). These 
authors observe that the relative rise in the pay and skill 
levels of finance workers in the US after 1980 was almost 
identical to that prior to 1930. The analysis suggests that 
the prime cause of this phenomenon in both periods was 
financial deregulation. Increases in corporate IPO activi-
ties  and  credit  risk  were  also  significant  determinants 
of the relative wage differential between the financial 
and nonfinancial sectors. In addition, economic “rent” 
appears to account for between 30 and 50 p.c. of the 
wage differential observed since 1990. By examining the 
role of different subsectors of the financial industry, the 
authors observe that the share of employment and the 
relative wage both increased rapidly after 1980 in the 
subsector “other finance” (which includes venture capi-
tal, private equity, hedge funds and investment banks), 
compared to the subsectors “credit intermediation” and 
“insurance”.
1.2  Structure of share ownership
The structure of ownership, or the dispersion of share-
holders, will influence the degree to which shareholders 
can control managerial remuneration. Managers will have 
more  power  in  firms  where  share  ownership  is  widely 
In other countries, such as France, Germany or Switzerland, shareholders have no vote on directors’ remuneration, 
nor on equity-based plans, but do have a binding vote on any capital increase or repurchase of own shares linked 
to the implementation of share-based plans. In Germany, for instance, a shareholders’ vote on equity-based plans 
is recommended by the corporate governance code, but not all listed companies comply with it.  (1) Since 2007, 
shareholders in France have been able to vote on executives’ severance pay.  (2) In Switzerland, the current provisions 
contained in the Civil Code are under review.  (3) The new provisions will strengthen the rights of annual general 
meetings on compensation issues, by requiring, among other things, that shareholders have a binding vote on 
compensation packages of non-executive board members and an advisory vote on compensation package of 
executive board members.
(1)  Directors’ remuneration for listed companies in Germany is governed by the following laws/best practices : Stock Corporation Act 1965 (Aktiengesetz – AktG), the 
German Corporate Governance Code (Cromme Code 2002, as amended in 2008), the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch – HGB), 2005 Management Board 
Remuneration Disclosure Act (Gesetzüber die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütung – VorstOG). Remuneration of the members of the supervisory board, in general, is 
fixed by a resolution of the general meeting by the simple majority or the (higher) majority provided for in the articles of association. The supervisory board fixes the 
remuneration of management board members.
(2)  L. 2007-1223 (TEPA law of 21 August 2007) governs the severance pay allowances for listed companies (“No rewards for failure”). Under the pressure of 
government, in October 2008, professionals adopted principles concerning the compensation of executive directors of companies whose shares are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market. These principles will become effective by 2010. 
(3)  Schweizerische Obligationenrecht (OR). The Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance (2002, as revised in 2008) is a non-binding, self-regulatory 
framework established by the Swiss business association “economiesuisse” for listed companies. Recommendations on compensation principally concern the 
governance process and the structure of variable compensation to be geared to the mid- to long-term performance of the company.144
(1)  See also Bebchuk and Fried (2003).
(2)  Collective action problems arise in the dispersed ownership context because 
shareholders have a common interest in monitoring board and managers’ 
activities, but no one owner has sufficient private incentive to do it him- 
or herself, since individual shareholders only receive a small percentage 
(corresponding to the shareholding) of the total benefits they generate, and 
monitoring is costly. These problems are exacerbated in the case of executive 
pay as individual shareholders are unlikely to see great gains from a reduction 
in pay costs, but they may suffer if management incentives are damaged as a 
result. In this case, exposure to public scrutiny through increased transparency 
and shareholders’ voice may induce the board of directors to take greater care in 
setting executive remuneration.
dispersed  and  where  there  is  no  large  shareholder  to 
impose  discipline.  In  the  case  of  dispersed  (or  diffuse) 
ownership,  one  might  argue  that  managers  also  have 
more opportunity to fill the board with “friendly” mem-
bers. This would allow managers to exert influence on 
the remuneration-setting process and engage in strategies 
that are suboptimal for shareholders, as they may deviate 
from  the  latter’s  interests.  (1)  In  such  a  situation,  remu-
neration schemes might be less performance-sensitive or 
based on measures of performance that can be manipu-
lated or are easily achieved. 
Large  shareholders  have  greater  means  than  dispersed 
owners to exercise control over managerial compensation. 
For instance, large shareholders can send a representative 
to the board of directors or attempt to influence the views 
of existing board members with respect to the design of 
remuneration  schemes.  In  addition,  in  countries  where 
ownership  is  more  concentrated,  shareholders  may  be 
better able to monitor managers and should also have 
more incentive to do so in that they suffer less from the 
collective  action  problem  faced  by  shareholders  under 
dispersed ownership ;  (2) therefore, there may be less need 
to  rely  on  the  remuneration  scheme  to  align  interests. 
However,  large  shareholders  will  vary  in  terms  of  their 
expertise,  information,  risk  appetite,  and  monitoring 
capabilities.
1.3  Transparency
The  principle  of  transparency  with  respect  to  execu-
tive and non-executive directors’ remuneration in listed 
companies  is  already  well  accepted  by  most  countries 
as good corporate governance. However, different firms 
and countries apply this principle with varying degrees of 
intensity, which may also depend on the different owner-
ship structures of listed companies and the ways in which 
the  agency  costs  problem  is  perceived  in  each  firm  or 
country. Moreover, even when firms disclose the level of 
their directors’ remuneration, they usually do not disclose 
how  they  actually  measure  top  management  perform-
ance. Lack of transparency with respect to remuneration 
is generally justified by confidentiality arguments. 
Transparency  is  even  lower  for  remuneration  of  non-
executive staff. While the existing rules mainly focus on 
remuneration  schemes  for  board  members  and  senior 
management in listed companies, no specific disclosure 
is required by law nor recommended by best practice for 
remuneration packages of employees at lower hierarchical 
levels in the organisation. However, the role of disclosure is 
particularly important in the case of financial institutions, 
given that the remuneration of certain non-executive staff 
may exceed that of executives. As noted above, these pay 
schemes can in fact have a significant impact on the level 
of risk-taking of the institution, particularly if the interests 
of managers who set them are not perfectly aligned with 
those of shareholders.
Greater disclosure and transparency regarding directors’ 
and employees’ remuneration and the procedure through 
which remuneration of executives and other employees is 
determined could help stakeholders to assess the incen-
tive structure and the extent to which risk-taking is being 
controlled. Transparency is all the more important given 
that proposed principles on compensation tend to take 
the form of general principles and do not provide specific 
guidelines  concerning  implementation.  These  principles 
recognise flexibility as an important feature, since firms 
differ in their goals, culture and business models, as well 
as the regulatory framework and labour markets in which 
they  function.  Remuneration  policy  is  still  a  field  in  a 
state of flux, and financial institutions will want to tailor 
compensation schemes to their own needs. Nevertheless, 
transparency  should  facilitate  the  emergence  of  best 
practices, and it may give some power to the principle of 
“name and shame” in the case of excessive risk-taking or 
failure to respect the best practices. 
To  the  extent  that  performance  pay  schemes  will  be 
implemented on a voluntary basis, an ongoing and open 
dialogue  between  financial  institutions  and  regulators 
will be necessary in order to facilitate the development 
of practices that address both financial stability concerns 
and the institutions’ need for competitive pay schemes. 
Effective disclosure will increase firms’ accountability and 
can sharpen monitoring and enforcement by sharehold-
ers, regulators and investors alike.
2.  Remuneration and risk-taking
The previous section has discussed the role of remunera-
tion in the context of the agency problem that exists 
between the shareholders and managers of a firm. To 
the extent that shareholders have a say in determining 
managers’ pay, the remuneration scheme can help align 
the interests of managers with those of the sharehold-
ers. On the other hand, to the extent that factors such 145
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as lack, or bad implementation, of corporate govern-
ance rules, ownership structure or opaque disclosure of 
pay schemes prevent shareholders from exerting control 
over remuneration, the remuneration scheme may serve 
managers’  interests.  The  impact  of  this  situation  on 
the risk profile of the financial institution, however, is 
uncertain.
An important aspect of the “interests” of shareholders 
of a financial institution is their risk appetite. This section 
explores the implications for risk-taking of financial insti-
tutions when remuneration schemes are aimed at aligning 
the interests of managers and shareholders. In order to do 
this, it is useful first to recall that different stakeholders 
have differing risk appetites. The optimal level of risk for 
the financial institution will depend upon the stakeholder 
whose point of view is being considered. This observation 
then gives rise to the question of the desirability of align-
ing managers’ and shareholders’ risk appetites. 
2.1    Financial institutions’ stakeholders and their risk 
appetites
Shareholders are residual claimants on profits and are the 
formal owners of the bank. Due to the differing payoff 
structures associated with equity and debt, shareholders 
and debt holders have differing views with respect to risk-
taking. Shareholders may seek to “shift risk”, implying for 
example that the firm will invest in assets that are riskier 
than those that the debt holders expected. The greater 
preference of shareholders for risk can be illustrated by 
considering an increase in the volatility of the firm’s busi-
ness, which is equivalent to a simultaneous increase of 
the upside and downside risk. While shareholders cash 
in fully on the higher profits associated with the higher 
upside risk, they do not incur the additional losses from 
realisations of the greater downside risk when the firm’s 
revenues are so low that claims of debt holders cannot 
be met.  (1) Hence, shareholders prefer strategies involving 
a higher degree of risk than is socially desirable. To the 
extent that management is making the investment deci-
sions and they try to maximise the wealth of sharehold-
ers, they will attempt riskier strategies than debt holders 
would desire. 
Debt  holders  and  depositors.  Debt  holders  have  fixed 
claims and only limited control rights, which are typically 
triggered upon default on debt repayment. Due to the 
fixed nature of their claims, debt holders do not gain from 
the increase in the upside risk of a risky strategy but may 
recover even less due to realisation of the extra downside 
risk  if  the  firm’s  revenues  do  not  fully  cover  the  debt 
repayments. Hence, debt holders are mainly concerned 
about the bank’s solvency and are averse to a high level of 
risk-taking. However, they are not able to completely pre-
vent shareholders from taking on risky projects because 
shareholders have the control rights over the institution. 
Debt holders often seek to limit excessive risk-taking by 
including covenants in debt contracts. Depositors can be 
considered to be uninformed debt holders and may thus 
be  considered  to  be  “represented”  by  regulators  (see 
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994).
Regulators are concerned with the impact of bank failure 
on systemic risk and seek to limit risk-taking by banks 
that  is  deemed  excessive  from  a  social  viewpoint.  The 
specific nature of financial systems, in fact, makes conta-
gion effects more likely and the macro-economic conse-
quences of a shock to the sector more widespread than 
for non-financial firms. 
Managers may be more or less risk averse than sharehold-
ers.  One  may  argue  that,  typically,  managers  are  more 
risk averse than shareholders, as managers have specific 
human capital and potentially substantial wealth invested 
in the firm, and they have limited possibilities to diversify 
this  specific  risk,  in  contrast  to  shareholders  who  are 
assumed to be able to diversify their holdings. This argu-
ment  implicitly  assumes  a  fixed  compensation  scheme 
for managers. The situation can change when managers 
receive performance-based pay.  (2) With regard to share-
holders’ “risk-shifting” discussed above, managers, too, 
may benefit from the “extra” upside more than they suffer 
from the “extra” downside and hence might pursue exces-
sively risky strategies. Emphasis on stock price perform-
ance in pay packages tends to align managers’ interests 
more closely with those of shareholders. However, manag-
ers may be induced to take on even more risk than share-
holders would like if the managers are paid with financial 
instruments that are particularly sensitive to the volatility 
of  the  underlying  stock  (e.g.,  stock  options).  Managers 
and shareholders may also differ with respect to their time 
horizons. Managers may not see their tenure with the firm 
as long-term and this may affect their decisions regarding 
the activities or the strategy of the institution. Finally, these 
decisions may also be influenced by the managerial labour 
market and the desire to acquire status. 
These observations suggest that shareholders cannot per-
fectly monitor managers and that a remuneration scheme 
that succeeds in aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders may result in either more or less risk-taking 
than  a  managerial  remuneration  scheme  over  which 
(1)  In other words, shareholders can be seen as holding a call option on a firm’s 
stock whose value increases with volatility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
(2)  See also Devriese, Dewatripont, Heremans and Nguyen (2004) for further 
discussion on corporate governance of banks and risk attitudes.146
shareholders  have  no  control.  Variable  remuneration 
above a certain threshold could give managers incentives 
to take very risky decisions. It is sometimes argued that 
the pressure on bank managers to maintain shareholder 
value prior to the crisis pushed them to take on additional 
risk. It is an open question as to whether this risk was 
consistent with shareholders’ preferences or whether it 
exceeded shareholders’ desires. 
2.2    Issues with aligning managers’ and 
shareholders’ risk appetites : whose risk appetite 
should the remuneration scheme reflect ?
Given the potential externalities created by bank failures 
and the greater appetite for risk of shareholders than debt 
holders, depositors or regulators, one may ask whether it 
is desirable for bank executives’ remuneration schemes to 
serve to align the interests of shareholders and manag-
ers. Alternatively, should remuneration policy for financial 
institutions be used as a regulatory instrument, designed 
to limit bank risk-taking perhaps below the level desired 
by the bank’s shareholders ? If so, whose preferred level of 
risk should be the target ? 
Apart  from  this  normative  issue,  in  practice  it  may  be 
difficult  for  shareholders,  especially  in  the  case  of  dis-
persed ownership, to obtain enough information about 
remuneration  (or  business  strategy)  to  judge  whether 
the level of risk of the institution is consistent with their 
own risk appetite. Furthermore, in the case of dispersed 
ownership, individual shareholders may have only weak 
incentives to monitor managers, preferring to free-ride on 
the monitoring activities of others. In the case of concen-
trated ownership, large shareholders, when able to exert 
control, have more power to better align risk-taking with 
their risk appetite. 
In  addition,  as  already  noted  above,  remuneration 
schemes  are  often  designed  to  attract,  motivate  and 
retain key talent in highly competitive markets. Hence, the 
structure of compensation may also be influenced by the 
labour  market.  One  potentially  adverse  outcome  could 
be a situation where managers or traders take on risky 
positions or activities in order to influence the short-term 
performance of the company, receive higher bonuses and 
thereby increase their value on the labour market. In line 
with  this  idea,  Sabourian  and  Sibert  (2009)  develop  a 
theoretical model that provides an explanation for “how 
the reward structure in the financial services industry led 
to a seemingly irrational behaviour of bankers and other 
employees of financial institutions prior to the financial 
crisis”. Bonus systems that depend on perceived talents, 
rather than on long-term results, give bankers incentives 
to rationally distort their behaviour so that it makes them 
look competent in the period when they act, even though 
this may lead to poor results for the firm in the long run.
The potentially significant impacts of risk-taking in finan-
cial institutions suggests that there is a need to design 
compensation schemes that are based on long-term firm-
wide profitability and that also take account of regulators’ 
concerns with minimising the risks of systemic crisis which 
can be triggered by a bank failure.
3.  Policy issues 
There are currently several policy initiatives underway in 
Europe to improve corporate governance and compensa-
tion schemes as key elements in the effective manage-
ment  of  financial  institutions  and  as  complements  to 
banking regulation. Table 1 provides an overview of some 
of  the  recent  proposals  relating  to  remuneration.  The 
proposals are described along the following dimensions : 
coverage within the financial institution ; governance of 
compensation ; alignment of compensation schemes and 
performance  measures ;  and  supervisory  oversight  and 
transparency.  (1) 
As can be seen from the table, current policy proposals 
focus on principles that are important for designing pay 
schemes  that  align  managers’  interests  and  long-term 
objectives.  Important  factors  for  achieving  this  include 
adequate disclosure on remuneration, the balance among 
different pay package components, the use of appropri-
ate  risk-adjusted  performance  metrics,  and  the  role  of 
independent  remuneration  committees  in  setting  and 
overseeing  the  remuneration  policy.  However,  the  pro-
posed  guidelines  on  remuneration  schemes  tend  to  be 
general and often do not provide guidance for supervisors 
on  implementation,  as  for  example  with  regard  to  the 
specific performance measures to be used. In addition, 
some of the issues discussed in Sections 1 and 2 of this 
paper do not seem to be explicitly addressed. In particular, 
the effectiveness of remuneration as a mechanism to align 
incentives and risk appetites, as well as the question of 
whose risk appetites should be aligned, is related to the 
management of agency problems between boards, share-
holders, and managers and to monitoring by independent 
directors, by shareholders, and by regulators.
(1)  In several European countries (the Netherlands, etc.), regulatory requirements/
principles on corporate governance and more specifically on remuneration 
schemes are currently under revision.147
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Table  1  ProPosed guidelines on remuneration schemes in financial institutions
 
Policy proposals Bank of italy : Regulation on Banks’ Organisation and Corporate Governance, March 2008.  (1)
international institute of finance (iif) : Final Report of the IIF Committee on Market Best Practices : 
Principles of Conduct and Best Practice Recommendations, July 2008.  (2)
de larosière committee (de larosière) : Report by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision, 
Chaired by J. de Larosière, February 2009.  (3)
committee of european Banking supervisors (ceBs) : High-level principles of Remuneration Policies, 
April 2009.  (4)
financial stability forum (fsf) : General principles for sound compensation practices 
in the financial sector, April 2009.  (5)
the uK financial services authority (fsa) : FSA draft code on remuneration practices, March 2009.  (6)
european commission (ec) : Commission Recommendation on remuneration policies 
in the financial services sector, April 2009.  (7)
   
Coverage Bank of italy : to banks and parent companies of banking groups. The provisions govern the role 
and functioning of managers and control bodies (bodies charged, with “strategic supervision”,  
“management” and “control” functions) and the relationship between these bodies  
and the company’s structure.
iif : to senior management, investment banking, and wholesale sales and trading of IIF member firms.
de larosière : to management, as well as to proprietary traders and asset managers, 
in the financial services industry.
ceBs : CEBS-regulated firms, to all levels of the organisation and all categories of employees, 
including members of the management body, with special emphasis on senior employees  
and other risk-takers and risk-managers in the institution.
fsf : to all financial centres ; to all bank employees who could impair a bank’s financial soundness 
through their behaviour.
fsa : remuneration at all levels in FSA-regulated firms.
ec : to risk-taking staff in financial undertakings ; a financial undertaking includes, 
but is not limited to, credit institutions, investment firms, insurance and reinsurance,  
undertakings, pension funds and collective investment schemes.
   
Governance of  
compensation
Bank of italy : majority independent remuneration committee performs advisory tasks 
on directors’ and managers’ remuneration.
ceBs : the supervisory body should determine the overall remuneration policy, ideally with the aid of 
an independent remuneration committee ; independent review on the implementation of the pay policy   
to avoid excessive risk-taking.
fsf : board of directors must actively oversee, monitor and regularly review the compensation systems 
at all levels of the organisation ; back-office and risk-control employees should not receive variable     
compensation strongly linked to high revenue or short-term profits.
fsa : a formal remuneration committee should reach independent judgements on the implications of 
remuneration for risk and risk management ; this committee should include at least one non-executive   
member with practical skills and experience of risk management ; the Risk and Compliance functions   
are required to have a significant input in setting the remuneration for other business units.
ec : the board should have responsibility for oversight of the operation of the remuneration policy 
for the financial institution as a whole with an adequate involvement of internal control functions  
and human resources departments or experts. Board members and other staff involved in the design   
and operation of remuneration policies should be independent.
(1)  It contains provisions that aim at strengthening the minimum standards of banks’ corporate organisation and governance : clear distinction of roles and responsibilities,  
appropriate checks and balances, balanced composition of governing bodies, effectiveness of controls, monitoring of all company risks and adequacy of information flows.  
The corporate governance arrangements adopted by banks and banking groups must ensure full, substantial compliance with these provisions by 30 June 2009.
(2)  The report represents the broad industry agreement on the need to address the many shortcomings highlighted by the market turbulence. It contains seven principles of  
conduct on compensation practices.
(3)  The de Larosière report analyses the causes of the financial crisis and contains policy proposals on financial regulation and supervision.
(4)  The CEBS has developed five general principles on remuneration policy within banking institutions.
(5)  The FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices issued in April 2009 focus on the way the structure of remuneration can create incentives towards excessive risk taking.
(6)  The code contains ten principles followed by guidance on each principle on possible means of compliance. The FSA will use these principles to assess the quality of  
a firm’s remuneration policy.
(7)  The European Commission has issued principles on remuneration of risk-taking staff in financial institutions on 30 April 2009. The Commission has also adopted  
a Recommendation on directors’ pay of listed companies.
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In terms of the institutions covered by the proposals, 
one  notable  feature  of  virtually  all  of  the  proposals 
is  that  they  apply  specifically  to  financial  institutions, 
both listed and non-listed. This signifies a recognition 
that  previous  regulatory  concerns  with  compensation 
and  risk-taking,  which  were  usually  either  implicit  or 
only piecemeal, needed to be transformed into explicit 
principles.
One  of  the  key  and  innovative  issues  tackled  by  these 
policies is that within the institution, the principles apply 
not only to pay schemes for senior management but also 
to  employees  at  lower  levels,  particularly  those  whose 
actions  may  have  an  impact  on  the  risk-taking  of  the 
institution. There appears to be agreement, for example, 
that  the  compensation  schemes  for  key  nonexecutive 
staff should no longer be determined by the business unit 
managers or by human resource departments. The overall 
compensation policy should be formulated at the top of 
the institution’s control hierarchy and applied at all levels 
of the institution. 
In  terms  of  governance  with  respect  to  oversight  and 
decision making, there seems to be broad agreement on 
the important role of independent remuneration commit-
tees in setting and regularly reviewing the remuneration 
Table  1  ProPosed guidelines on remuneration schemes in financial institutions (continued)
 
Alignment of
pay schemes / performance 
measures / form of pay
italy : remuneration schemes must be consistent with prudent risk management and the company’s 
long-term objectives.
iif : compensation policies should be aligned with shareholder interests and long-term, 
firm-wide profitability, taking into account overall risk and the cost of capital.
de larosière : bonuses should reflect actual performance, assessed over a multi-year framework.
ceBs : pay structures should align personal and company objectives over the long term, 
avoiding excessive risk-taking ; performance pay should be based on individual, business unit  
and the overall company’s performance ; performance measures for bonus awards should be  
adjusted for risks and cost of capital ; the bonus should contain a deferred component,  
based on the risk horizon of the performance (no big bonuses awards purely in upfront cash).
fsf : compensation should be adjusted for all types of risk, different risk outcomes, and the time 
scale of the risk ; the structure of pay (cash/equity mix, etc.) should be balanced and consistent  
with the firm’s goals and prudent risk-taking.
fsa : remuneration policies must be consistent with effective risk management, including 
long- and short-term risk, cost of capital and liquidity requirements, and should not encourage  
excessive risk-taking by employees ; financial measures should entail the adjustment of profit  
measures to reflect the relative riskiness of different activities and should relate to more than  
one financial year ; a significant proportion of the bonus award should be paid in a deferred form,  
with a deferral period appropriate to the nature of the business and its risks, and should be subject  
to upward-downward performance adjustments over the deferral period.
ec : remuneration policies for risk-taking staff should be consistent with and promote sound and 
effective risk management ; they should strike an appropriate balance between the level of the core  
pay and the level of the bonus. The payment of the major part of the bonus should be deferred  
in order to take into account risks linked to the underlying performance through the business cycle.  
Performance measurement criteria should privilege longer-term performance of financial institutions  
and adjust the underlying performance for risk, cost of capital and liquidity.
   
Supervisory oversight  
and engagement  
by stakeholders
Internal / External  
Transparency
Bank of italy : the shareholders’ meeting must be provided with adequate information 
on the implementation of remuneration policies ; well-designed internal flows of information  
that allow management decisions to be taken on an informed basis ; the Bank of Italy will judge  
the conformity of compensation and incentive schemes with the set standards.
iif : the approach, principles, and objectives of compensation incentives should be transparent 
to stakeholders.
de larosière : supervisors should oversee the suitability of financial institutions’ compensation policies, 
in order to avoid excessive risk-taking.
ceBs : remuneration policy should be transparent internally and adequately disclosed externally.
fsf : supervisors should include compensation practices in their risk assessment ; appropriate and 
timely disclosure on compensation practices (and risk position) toward all stakeholders.
fsa : the FSA will use these principles to assess the quality of a firm’s remuneration policy, 
which will be taken into account when assessing a firm’s approach to compliance and risk-taking.
ec : remuneration policy should be transparent internally and adequately disclosed to stakeholders. 
Supervisors should ensure that financial institutions apply the principles on sound remuneration  
policies, taking into account of the nature and scale of the financial institution and the complexity  
of its activities.
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policies. Most of the proposed principles also recognise 
the need for including members in the committee who 
have  the  necessary  expertise  in  risk  management,  in 
order to avoid excessive risk-taking through pay practices. 
For the first time, the risk and compliance functions are 
assigned significant input by certain proposals in setting 
the remuneration for other business units.
With  respect  to  performance  measures,  many  of  the 
proposed guidelines suggest that compensation policies 
should be consistent with the desired risk profile of the 
financial institution, over the long-term. In other words, 
and  in  particular  with  respect  to  performance-related 
pay,  the  financial  measures  on  which  the  variable  part 
of remuneration is based should be adjusted for risk and 
sensitive to the time horizon of risk. Only one of the pro-
posals suggests that remuneration should be symmetric in 
risk outcomes (i.e., adjusted in both positive and negative 
directions as a result of performance). 
One  specific  issue  that  arises  in  relation  to  this  discus-
sion  is  the  difficulty  of  measuring  risk.  That  fact  that 
compensation schemes for financial institutions currently 
do not make use of risk-adjusted metrics is perhaps due 
in part to the limitations in measuring risk. Performance 
criteria  used  by  banks  for  determining  the  variable  or 
the  equity-based  portion  of  remuneration  have  tended 
to  include  measures  such  as  share  performance,  gross 
operating income, net income, revenues, or earnings per 
share, which may be subject to financial manipulation  (1) 
or do not provide employees with sufficient incentives to 
consider the risk undertaken. 
In  principle,  there  are  at  least  two  ways  of  mitigating 
excessive  risk-taking  by  employees,  and  they  are  not 
mutually exclusive. One is to put in place effective risk 
limits that are independent of compensation. The other 
is  to  adjust  pay  for  risk,  thereby  curbing  incentives  to 
take excessive risk in the first place. In either case, it is 
important to assess the risks taken in a reliable fashion 
and to make sure that the limits that are imposed are 
effective. Failure by either of these methods to capture 
the true risk is likely to result in excessive risk-taking. The 
proposals, by recommending that variable pay is linked 
to risk, refer to measures of risk and also to measures 
of risk outcomes. However, they do not offer guidelines 
regarding  implementation.  Adjusting  remuneration  for 
risk, while desirable in principle, may be quite difficult to 
achieve in practice.  (2) 
Moreover, one issue which is not explicitly addressed in 
these proposals is the meaning of the term “excessive” 
risk, which again raises the question of whose risk appe-
tite should be used as the benchmark. 
Finally,  concerning  disclosure,  most  policy  proposals 
recognise  transparency  with  respect  to  remuneration 
schemes at all levels as important for assessing pay scales 
and incentive structures. Disclosure should be related to 
risk management as well and should make it easier for 
all stakeholders to assess the relation between pay and 
risk-adjusted performance. At the same time, exposure to 
public scrutiny encourages the board of directors to take 
greater care in setting remuneration.
In terms of the possibility for shareholders to review the 
board’s actions in this area and to react to any potential 
abuse, only the regulation issued by the Bank of Italy spe-
cifically states that the shareholders’ meeting will approve 
remuneration policies for directors, employees, and exter-
nal collaborators, as well as equity-based plans. 
Conclusions
The current financial crisis has put remuneration schemes 
in the financial sector at the heart of ongoing debate on 
corporate governance reform and financial stability. The 
structure of variable pay schemes is in fact seen as one 
factor that has aggravated the crisis (and according to 
some observers, directly contributed to it). Compensation 
schemes appear to have resulted in excessive risk-taking 
by financial institutions. 
This article has considered some conceptual issues relating 
to the role of remuneration in financial institutions and 
discussed current policy proposals in light of these issues. 
One  of  the  first  observations  is  that  remuneration  has 
traditionally been viewed in the context of the corporate 
governance of firms, serving to align the interests of firm 
managers and shareholders. Rules that have been devel-
oped in this context have generally applied only to the 
executives of listed firms, both non-financial and financial. 
In  this  framework,  improving  shareholders’  powers  to 
approve or veto remuneration schemes, their incentives 
to monitor firm management and the information they 
receive regarding the firm’s remuneration policies will all 
contribute to the effective alignment of managerial and 
shareholders’ interests. 
(1)  For instance, increasing leverage is a technique that can be used to boost 
earnings per share. 
(2)  The FSA specifically recommends basing financial performance measures 
principally on profits, which are a better measure than revenues or turnover from 
this point of view, but they should be adjusted for risks. Common techniques to 
adjust profits and capital for risks are based on the calculation of economic profit 
or economic capital. However, accounting profits do not capture adequately 
future risks and the FSA acknowledges that a certain degree of judgement in 
decisions on the performance-related part of remuneration is necessary.150
However, the importance of risk-taking in financial insti-
tutions, together with their regulated status, raises ques-
tions  regarding  the  degree  to  which  the  traditional 
corporate governance approach to remuneration design 
in financial institutions is actually desirable. Shareholders 
prefer  greater  risk-taking  than  do  debt  holders  and 
depositors, suggesting that it may be desirable to adopt 
a more conservative approach to the design of remunera-
tion schemes for financial institutions. For instance, the 
level of risk that was taken at some institutions prior to 
the  crisis  may  have  been  consistent  with  shareholders’ 
risk appetites, but “excessive” from the regulator’s or the 
social point of view.(1) This issue has received relatively little 
attention to date. 
Another important issue for financial institutions is the link 
between  remuneration  schemes  for  key  non-executive 
staff (such as traders) and the risk profile of the institution. 
The potential impact of compensation on risk-taking at all 
levels in a financial institution and the resulting effects on 
the risk profile of the entire institution argue for formulat-
ing remuneration policy proposals specifically for finan-
cial institutions. Such proposals should also foresee the 
integral involvement of risk and compliance personnel in 
the design and implementation of remuneration schemes 
within the institution.
The proposals reviewed in Section 3 embody these ideas. 
They  apply  directly  to  financial  institutions,  both  listed 
and non-listed ; they envisage a significant role for the 
risk management function in the design of remuneration 
schemes ;  and  they  specify  that  the  institution’s  remu-
neration policy should apply to all staff engaged in risk-
taking activities. These proposals make explicit the role of 
compensation in the internal risk governance of financial 
institutions.
Finally, there is a need to design compensation schemes 
that are based on long-term profitability and that also take 
account of regulators’ concerns with minimising the risk 
of systemic crisis which can be triggered by a bank failure. 
In fact, most of the proposals discussed in Section 3 call 
for linking compensation with risk or with risk-adjusted 
measures of long-term performance. Yet, the proposals 
do not provide guidelines for implementation. This is sig-
nificant, since reliance on imperfect risk measures may not 
achieve the intended effect and, more importantly, may 
create arbitrage-like opportunities for taking on risk that 
is unrecognised by the measures. Adjusting remuneration 
for risk, while desirable in principle, may be quite difficult 
to achieve in practice.
(1)  As is pointed out in the FSA’s Turner report, many senior managers of financial 
institutions that have suffered from the crisis were large shareholders in their firms 
and had invested large proportions of their cash bonuses in their firms’ shares.151
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